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ABSTRACT
Mandated requirements to share information across differ-
ent sensitivity domains necessitate the design of distributed
architectures to enforce information flow policies while pro-
viding protection from malicious code and attacks devised
by highly motivated adversaries. The MYSEA architecture
uses component security services and mechanisms to extend
and inter-operate with commodity PCs, commodity client
software, applications, trusted components, and legacy sin-
gle level networks, providing new capabilities for composing
secure, distributed multilevel secure solutions. This results
in an architecture that meets two compelling requirements:
first, that users have a familiar work environment, and, sec-
ond, that critical mandatory security policies are enforced.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 Software:
Operating Systems – Security and Protection, Organization
and Design
General Terms: Design; Security
Keywords: access controls, authentication, information flow
controls, cryptographic controls
1. INTRODUCTION
Governments and organizations call for the enforcement
of mandatory confidentiality and integrity policies, yet these
same policies now mandate the selective sharing of informa-
tion among individuals and groups with differing sensitivity
attributes [32, 1]. Applicable environments include: mil-
itary coalitions, agencies and organizations responding to
security emergencies, and mandated sharing in business and
financial relationships. Neither military computer systems
and networks, nor their commercial sector equivalents, are
currently organized to provide high assurance support for
multilevel security policy enforcement and adequate defense
against increasingly sophisticated attacks. The lack of ro-
bust security risks corruption of critical data and systems,
leakage of sensitive information, and degradation of service
to fundamental infrastructure systems. Industrial systems
run the risk of economic espionage, while the lack of policy
support for intelligence and Joint Command and Control
Systems constrains government and military operations.
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To secure mission-critical information systems, new trusted
computing approaches are required, involving both interop-
erable system security features and standardized security
mechanisms. We describe an innovative high assurance ar-
chitecture to provide trusted security services and integrated
operating system mechanisms that can protect distributed
multilevel secure computing environments from malicious
code and other attacks. These security services and mech-
anisms extend and inter-operate with existing applications
and commodity clients, providing new capabilities for com-
posing secure distributed systems using commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) components. The latter objective results from
the realization that unless a secure system offers users the
same comfortable and familiar interfaces used for handling
routine information, it will fail due to lack of acceptability.
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) [37, 34,
39, 38, 36, 55, 54] provides a trusted distributed operat-
ing environment for enforcing multilevel security policies.
Careful design allows it to encompass many low assurance
commercial components and commodity productivity appli-
cations, with relatively few specialized high-assurance ele-
ments. This arrangement protects an organization’s ongoing
investment in commodity desktop systems and applications,
and permits these components to be integrated into an en-
vironment where enforcement of critical security policies is
assigned to more trusted elements. Trust is derived from
the application of high assurance system design and devel-
opment methods to the trusted elements as well as to the
overall architecture.
The locus of policy enforcement in MYSEA is a federa-
tion of high assurance servers. We have vertically integrated
application security requirements with underlying security
services, and can apply an existing Quality of Security Ser-
vice model and framework [47] to the integrated security
structure. Additionally, MYSEA supports secure trusted
path communications between the user and the trusted OS,
as well as high assurance labeling for incoming traffic from
legacy single level networks.
The state of the art for protecting multilevel information
and for the management of security policies and security ser-
vices in support of critical applications is advanced through
several innovations:
1. A distributed security architecture incorporating trusted
components in support of multilevel information pro-
cessing using commercial and open source applications.
This innovative use of trusted components in a client-
server architecture significantly leverages the impact
of highly trusted systems.
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2. A remote trusted path mechanism that assures unam-
biguous user communication with the trusted comput-
ing base and is independent of client workstation se-
curity.
3. Techniques for vertical integration of security policy
control functions with underlying security services in
a Quality of Security Service framework.
4. Secure integration of existing classified networks. These
connections may be initiated either from clients within
the multilevel network to access single level resources,
or from existing single level networks to access re-
sources on the multilevel server.
The remainder of this paper begins with a description of
the concepts and requirements that provide the basis for the
MYSEA architecture. This is followed by details regarding
the structural aspects of primary MYSEA components. In
Section 4, we discuss related work. We close with our con-
clusions and a brief description of some of the future plans
for MYSEA.
2. CONCEPTS AND REQUIREMENTS
MYSEA is a distributed client-server architecture featur-
ing a combination of (relatively few) specialized policy en-
forcing components and multiple open source and commer-
cial off-the-shelf components.
The MYSEA network architecture affords users the abil-
ity to securely access information across networks at dif-
ferent classifications using standardized commodity appli-
cations. Highly trustworthy MLS servers provide the locus
of security policy enforcement, while the highly trustworthy
Trusted Path Extensions (TPEs) and Trusted Communi-
cations Modules (TCMs) authenticate/disambiguate users
and single level networks, respectively. The TPE is a gate-
keeper for user interaction with the MYSEA Server; whereas
the TCM controls the access of single-level networks to the
Server. Other system components provide users the abil-
ity to run unmodified office productivity tools, web-based
services, and DoD applications. Federated servers support
scalability, which, when combined with single sign-on and
virtualization, result in a extensible computing environment.
The major components of the architecture are shown in
Figure 1 [55] and include:
• High assurance MYSEA Servers, which provide the lo-
cus for multilevel security policy enforcement and host
various open source or commercial application proto-
col servers.
• Client workstations executing popular software appli-
cations; and TPEs, which interface between the client
and the MYSEA Server, providing trustworthy net-
work security, identification and authentication, and
policy support.
• Existing classified single level networks connected to
the MYSEA Server via TCMs and link encryptors.
TCMs complement link encryption by ensuring proper
labeling of data passed back to the MYSEA Server.
• Single level servers in the Multilevel Enclave area pro-
vide application services to both local clients and those
in the legacy networks.
The MYSEA Server enforces a unified mandatory access
control policy for both confidentiality (including read-down)
and integrity. With this basis, MYSEA provides services to
support high assurance remote client authentication, session
management, and connection to legacy single level networks.
Users also have access to a set of application services, includ-
ing SMTP, IMAP, and HTTP, which run on the MYSEA
Server. Support for regrading policies is implemented in
trusted applications that are constrained by the underlying
reference validation mechanism. Multiple intercommunicat-
ing MYSEA Servers provide scalability within the security
policy perimeter.
2.1 Usage Scenario
End users operate at client computers on the local multi-
level LAN as well as on the legacy single level networks (see
Coalition, SIPRNet, and NIPRNet Enclaves in Figure 1).
On the MLS LAN, the Trusted Path Extension provides
a trusted path by which users log on to the MYSEA system.
The TPE is a special purpose high assurance component
inserted between the untrusted client workstation and the
MLS LAN. TPE log-on establishes an identity for audit and
access control purposes; then the user negotiates a session
level from the range of security levels bounded by his clear-
ance. The session level determines the domain of data and
resources accessible to the user during that session, per the
MLS policy.
Subsequent to session level negotiation, the user can then
log on to the client workstation and use its software (e.g.,
web browser, e-mail client applications, or various office pro-
ductivity tools) locally or to access several types of remote
services: MLS services on the MYSEA Server, single-level
services hosted on servers in the local multilevel enclave,
and single-level services hosted on servers in the remote sin-
gle level networks. To meet object reuse requirements [53],
client state is purged at the end of each session, and data
created or modified on the clients is stored on the MYSEA
Server.
At any time, the user can invoke the trusted path to re-
quest a session level change, log off, etc. The Trusted Path
Extension blocks access to the network while the user’s se-
curity attributes are in flux during such operations.
Legacy network users are authenticated in their remote
environment, the senstivity of which establishes their session
levels for actions in the MYSEA environment. These remote
users are provided two types of services: MLS services on the
MYSEA Server, and single-level services hosted on servers
in the multilevel enclave.
2.2 Threats and Requirements
The threats that MYSEA is designed to address fall into
two major classes [34]: developmental threats and oper-
ational threats. The former includes insiders who intend
to subvert the system, while the latter fall into three sub-
classes: network threats, malicious software, and user or
application misbehavior.
Developmental threats include errors made by the devel-
opment team or the malicious insertion of unintended func-
tionality by adversaries, both of which undermine or subvert
the ability of the system to protect itself from tampering or
to continuously enforce critical security policy [2, 52].
Network threats are attacks to the communications proto-
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Figure 1: Monterey Security Architecture
ple, an attempt could be made to use a non-TCBE equipped
workstation attached to the LAN to modify or collect com-
munications traffic.
Malicious software is the principal operational threat to
the server. This software may attempt to violate security
policies for information confidentiality or integrity by ob-
taining unauthorized access to information. Trojan Horse
software represents a classic example of malicious software
and can be used to either directly or indirectly access infor-
mation [43].
Misbehavior applies to user actions at the client worksta-
tion that may initiate or participate in attacks. In this case,
either users or their software attempt to bypass the TCB
Extension in order to gain unauthorized access to protected
information.
The system requirements are constructed to address these
threats (see Appendix A in [34]). Next, we present system
requirements in three categories: access control policies, as-
surance, and security features.
2.3 Access Control Policies
MYSEA supports both mandatory access control (MAC),
and discretionary access control (DAC):
1. MAC – under this policy, the MYSEA Server enforces
lattice-based policies, such as the national rules regard-
ing access to classified information represented by the
TOP SECRET, SECRET, and UNCLASSIFIED sen-
sitivity labels. This requirement is met by the separa-
tion of resources into equivalence classes, and explicitly
allowed flows between classes.
2. DAC – under this policy, MYSEA Server restricts the
ability of processes, acting on behalf of users, to access
data objects such as files. The access decisions are
based on the MYSEA user identities associated with
the processes, and permissions that are registered with
the Server. Applications and users may modify permis-
sions via runtime functions.
2.4 Assurance
Our rigorous security engineering and development pro-
cesses [34] are intended to provide robust assurance of pol-
icy enforcement by the trusted components in the MYSEA
system. Under this process, the threat model and system re-
quirements specifications form the basis for the system archi-
tecture. From these, we derive functional specifications and
corresponding detailed design specifications, source code,
verification and testing. A key element of system assurance
is the allocation of policy to components that occurs during
the design process.
2.4.1 High Assurance Allocation of Policy
In the design of a distributed system architecture intended
to meet high assurance requirements, the definition of both
the TCB perimeter and the allocation of security policy to
various components permits the system to be decomposed
into analyzable components. A number of basic principles
and security engineering notions come into play. Among
these are the ordering of security dependencies, the order-
ing of trust and trustworthiness [45], and the principle of
least privilege [65] as manifested in the organization of com-
ponents that enforce or support the enforcement of policy, as
well as components that are trusted with respect to policy.
Security dependencies in the system should be partially
ordered, since if the dependencies are circular then an in-
creasingly large component must be examined in its totality
to determine if it maintains the desirable security properties.
Furthermore, for their correct operation, partially ordered
components will trust the components upon which they de-
pend. If the components that are being depended upon are
not trustworthy, i.e., demonstrates some measurable level
of compliance with its stated functionality, then no amount
of trustworthiness in the dependent component can remedy
the architectural flaw created by an incorrect dependency.
If an overall security policy can be decomposed into dis-
crete goals (e.g., rule sets); and the system design is such
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that the enforcement of each individual goal can be allo-
cated to one or more operational components, the resulting
security architecture will manifest a composition of policy
subsets (e.g., “TCB subsets” in [70]). This organization sup-
ports a realization of the principle of least privilege, whereby
no subset implementation is endowed with more authority
(or commensurate trust) than is necessary to perform its
allocated function(s).
The design of architectures that reflect the notions de-
scribed above is currently a non-formulaic process, and re-
quires careful consideration over and above following estab-
lished security engineering principles. One must understand
how component composition may affect the ability of the
system to properly enforce each of its constituent policies.
For example, improper organization may permit components
enforcing “weaker policies”, like DAC, to deny those enforc-
ing stronger policies, like MAC, from meeting their specified
requirements.
2.5 Security Features
Major security features that MYSEA is designed to sup-
port include:
1. Secure connections to classified networks
2. Centralized security management
3. Use of adaptive security techniques to provide dynamic
security services
4. True multilevel access to data at multiple levels of se-
curity using a single commodity workstation
5. Integration of multilevel security with existing sensi-
tive networks
6. High assurance trusted communication channels to clas-
sified networks
7. Secure single sign-on across multiple MLS servers
8. Server replication to support scalability
9. IPv6 in a multilevel context
10. Interoperability with the DoD PKI infrastructure
11. High assurance trusted path techniques for managing
access to classified networks
In addition to the obvious features listed above, two other
features are descibed in more detail below.
2.5.1 Policy-Aware Applications
Policy-aware means that an application has been modi-
fied to run in a given policy environment without needing
extraordinary privileges, and is then both fully functional
and constrained by that policy [33]. Usually, applications
do not need to be policy aware, and are suitably constrained
by the underlying policy mechanisms. However, in some en-
vironments, such as those with MLS policies, application
modifications are required.
MYSEA’s HTTP server, which includes an MLS-enabled
wiki, is a concrete example of a policy-aware application. In
the wiki, multilevel technology permits collaborators with
different security attributes in a coalition environment to
maximize information sharing while still adhering to the con-
straints of the overall security policy [58]. Multilevel-aware
instances of the wiki execute as untrusted subjects within
the context of a multilevel architecture. MLS policy is en-
forced with high assurance by the MYSEA Server, which
ensures that wiki users logged in at high sensitivity levels
are able to read and post information at their level, but
may not write information to lower sensitivity levels. Corre-
spondingly, users at lower sensitivity levels are only allowed
access to less sensitive information.
2.5.2 Dynamic Security Services
Complex and adaptive networks may require changes on
demand to the security provided. When conditions on the
network change, requirements for security — e.g., restric-
tions as seen from the users’ or attackers’ point of view —
may also change. In MYSEA, the DSS Quality of Secu-
rity Service (QoSS) mechanisms located on the TPE and
at the MYSEA Server can modify the protection services
afforded to an ongoing session, in response to a change noti-
fication. The selection of protection mechanisms for client-
server communications may be based upon network condi-
tions such as INFOCON mode. A version of IPSec, adapted
to provide automated, dynamic QoSS through the use of
an enhanced version of a policy server such as Keynote [13]
permits selection of protection mechanisms.
3. MYSEA DISTRIBUTED STRUCTURE
The MYSEA Server implements both multilevel and dis-
cretionary security policies while maintaining support for
new and legacy applications and unmodified commodity client
systems. The architecture supports protocols and equip-
ment from a wide range of vendors as well as secure in-
teraction with external classified networks. The mandatory
access control (MAC) security policy is based on the Bell
and LaPadula [10] confidentiality policy and the Biba [12]
integrity policy.
The access-control policy foundation for the MYSEA Server
is the BAE XTS-400 [5], which has been awarded a Com-
mon Criteria [18] EAL5 certification (see http://www.niap-
ccevs.org/cc-scheme/st/vid10293) for its combined hardware
base and STOP operating system. MYSEA extends the
XTS-400 with an MLS network interface and TCP/IP stack,
remote trusted path, remote file system, and remote inter-
active shell capability.
The MYSEA software architecture is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. The MYSEA Server, TPE and TCM components all
have a common foundation: a high assurance operating en-
vironment (i.e., LPSK [46] and STOP OS), the Protected
Communications Service (PCS) and DSS.
The PCS component provides IPsec-based protected com-
munication channels between the TPE and server, and be-
tween the TCM and the server. The DSS components im-
plement a dynamic service management mechanism that can
adjust PCS protection in response to external changes and
threats, as envisioned for the Global Information Grid (GIG)
[79].
The Trusted Path Service (TPS) and Trusted Path Appli-
cation (TPA) components together enforce the identification
and authentication supporting policy to ensure that only au-
thorized users can gain access to the system. The TPA af-
fords the users unspoofable access to security critical services



























Figure 2: MYSEA Software Architecture
ponent on the server handles user authentication and ses-
sion negotiation functions. Likewise, the Trusted Channel
Service (TCS) and the Trusted Channel Application (TCA)
components ensure that traffic between a single level net-
work and the MYSEA Server are properly labeled at the
classification level of the particular network.
3.1 Trusted Path Extension and Trusted
Channel Module
The Trusted Path Extension (TPE) and Trusted Commu-
nications Module (TCM) help to enforce policies under the
direction of the MYSEA Server, but neither is empowered
to make policy decisions.
When a user logs in, the TPE passes the user’s identity
credentials to the MYSEA Server, which validates the login
attempt and instructs the TPE whether to allow or deny
access to the network. In negotiating a session level, the
TPE passes the user’s session level request to the Server
for a decision. After a successful login and session level
negotiation, the TPE allows the user to access the MLS LAN
and the MYSEA Server as well as services in the Multilevel
Enclave and the single level networks.
Similarly, the Trusted Channel Module (TCM) helps to
map the single level networks to specific security levels, en-
suring for example, that “IP-spoofing” could not be used by
a malicious remote user to access the wrong level of informa-
tion. Users on these networks can only access data on the
MYSEA Server at the classification level of the single level
network from which they are operating.
3.2 Workstations
The use of a single client workstation for cross-domain ac-
cess provides a dramatic physical footprint reduction com-
pared to other approaches. However, without appropriate
security measures, use of a single workstation could mag-
nify the risk of information leakage. In particular, residual
information in memory or other internal components of the
workstation allocated during a high session may be improp-
erly reallocated to a low session. To address these object
reuse issues, MYSEA uses stateless, i.e. diskless, clients.
All user data objects and related metadata are stored on
the MLS server rather than on the workstation. To avoid
object reuse with respect to state elements on the client













































Figure 3: MYSEA Server Processes
transition to a less sensitive session. Boot odometer support
[75] could monitor this procedure.
3.3 DSS Tool
The DSS tool manages the IPsec configurations available
to the MYSEA components. At initialization, the DSS Ad-
min Tool connects to the DSS Server and thereafter, it con-
veys users’ input to the DSS Server. Its functions include:
Set Policy; Reload Policies; get and display Server IKE Secu-
rity Association Database information; and get and display
Server IPSec Security Policy Database information.
3.4 MYSEA Server
The MYSEA Server comprises a set of interacting pro-
cesses that implement various multilevel services and single-
level applications. As shown in Figure 3, trusted, multilevel
processes control the invocation of single-level applications
that interact with the user at the user’s current session level.
3.4.1 Multilevel Services
MYSEA offers the following multilevel services: Trusted
Path, Secure Session, Trusted Remote Session, and Dynamic
Security. Single-level application support is provided by Ap-
plication Protocol Servers and Remote Applications, along
with support from CGI processes.
Trusted Path Service
The Trusted Path Service is provided by a single TPS
parent and multiple TPS child processes. The parent pro-
cess is started at initialization and monitors the network for
TPE connection requests. If a request comes from a valid
TPE, the TPS parent creates a TPS child process to service
the connection (e.g., handle TPE requests to login, change
session level, run, and logout). The TPS parent and child
processes execute at the system network security level (viz.,
system high) and have privileges to access system identifi-
cation and authentication information, and both MAC and
DAC bypass privileges.
The TPS child processes also create the Trusted Remote
Session Server (TRSS) parent process for each user name
and session level pair (see below); and support the DSS
server and DSS Clients with respect to various user/TPE
activities. The TPS child alerts the DSS Server when it en-
counters an error and when the user has initiated a RUN
or Logout command. Depending on the situation, the DSS
server may take various actions, such as changing the secu-
rity configuration of the DSS Client, or blocking the TPE.
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Secure Session Service
At start-up, the Secure Session Daemon (SSD) process
starts a Secure Session Server (SSS) parent process for each
supported application protocol. Each SSS parent accepts
and validates application protocol service requests from TPE
clients for its particular TCP/IP protocol (IMAP, SMTP,
HTTP, etc). The parent process ensures that the request is
from either a TPE with a valid session, or a valid Remote
Application, and it creates an SSS child process to service
the connection. After creating the child, the parent contin-
ues to monitor for new application protocol service requests.
The SSS child process creates an Application Protocol Server
(APS) process and handles communications between the
client TPE (or Remote Applications) and the APS. The APS
process is created with the privileges of the user session re-
sponsible for the TPE or RA request. The SSS child and the
APS processes communicate via a MYSEA Socket which is
allocated by the TPS child process.
Trusted Remote Session Service
The Trusted Remote Session Service (TRSS) processes
handle communication requests from Remote Applications.
There is a TRSS parent process for each user name and ses-
sion level pair — e.g., a given user might have sessions at
the same level on different client workstations, all of which
would be serviced by the same TRSS parent. The TRSS
parent process creates a TRSS child for each new remote
connection request from a Remote Application (RA). The
TRSS child process handles all remote connections with the
RA.
For each connection established for the RA to the destina-
tion, the TRSS child process updates a database to associate
a user ID and session level with a particular destination IP,
destination port, source IP and source port.
The TRSS processes execute at the system network se-
curity level, and they have privileges to communicate with
remote applications, and to be started by a trusted process.
Dynamic Security Service
TheDynamic Security Service (DSS) include a DSS Server
Parent process, one or more DSS Server child processes, one
or more DSS Clients, and the DSS tool (see 3.3 for a de-
scription of the latter). The DSS Clients and DSS Tool are
typically on different nodes of the network than the MYSEA
Server.
DSS Server parent handles communication requests from
DSS Clients. It creates a TRSS child for each new connec-
tion request, ensuring that there is only one connection for
each DSS Client. The DSS Server parent also handles com-
mands from the DSS Admin Tool and the TPS process —
e.g., to change the dynamic parameter or load a new config-
uration — to which it responds by passing these commands
to the appropriate DSS Server child.
The DSS Clients coordinate security policies with the PCS
components, manage IKE daemons, and take direction from
the DSS child processes. The DSS child may request: the
load/unload of a security configuration, restart of its IKE
daemon, and the return of IKE/IPSec information.
3.4.2 Application Invocations
Applications may be invoked on the MYSEA Server from
client workstations, as well as from components on the server.
TheApplication Protocol Server (APS) process implements
the server side of an application level client/server proto-
col. MYSEA provides the following APS services: HTTP
(Apache), WebDav, IMAP, SMTP, and MLS Wiki. An APS
process communicates with the client via a MYSEA socket
managed by an SSS child process. The program for an APS
process is an implementation of an industry standard ap-
plication protocol, which is policy aware, i.e., it has been
modified to allow it to interact in a multilevel environment
and to use the MYSEA socket infrastructure; e.g., calls to
socket in the APS are changed to mskt socket.
One particular APS, using the HTTP protocol, supports
a menu of Remote Applications from which the user at the
client workstation can choose. In response to such a choice,
the HTTP APS invokes a simple CGI process, which initiates
the chosen Remote Application.
Users can launch certain interactive shell sessions via the
WebShell CGI program, and can use the MYSEA WebDAV
APS to navigate the MYSEA Server’s file structure (e.g.,
home directories and the Apache document root).
The Remote Application (RA) is an application program
executing on the server on behalf of the client. As with the
APS processes, the program for an RA process is an im-
plementation of an industry standard application protocol,
which has been modified to allow it to interact in a multilevel
environment and to use the MYSEA socket infrastructure.
An RA process communicates with the client via a MYSEA
Socket managed by a TRSS child process. For example,
when a RA wants to establish a new remote connection, it
signals the TRSS parent process, which starts a TRSS child
process to handle the connection.
MYSEA includes the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
remote application.
4. RELATED WORK
Hinke suggested the idea of a high assurance server to
provide a locus of multilevel secure control to single level
clients [31]. In his design sketch, clients were relegated to
a single level and were connected to the multilevel server
via single level network links. Although possibly useful in
certain static situations, the architecture does not provide
the flexibility inherent in the MYSEA design. By restrict-
ing the client to a single level throughout its lifetime, users
must access multiple clients in order to manipulate informa-
tion at several levels. In contrast, MYSEA allows clients to
renegotiate session levels and users need only one client.
Rushby and Randell [64] describe a design for a distributed
secure system that utilizes trusted network interface units
(TNIUs) to connect workstations at different access classes
to a local area network, through which access to a dis-
tributed multilevel file server is provided. Identification and
authentication of users, as well as session level negotiation
via the TNIUs is also described. Over and above this func-
tionality, the MYSEA architecture also allows a more gen-
eral purpose client-server operating environment, whereby
new application servers can be easily added to the system,
and thin clients are easily supported.
Various virtual machine monitor approaches have been
suggested [14, 42, 7] for supporting COTS applications while
reliably separating different domains of data. In general, for
these approaches to be trustworthy requires both the use of
strictly virtualizable hardware [29], and a trustworthy mon-
itor mechanism for separating the activities of the virtual
machines. Creating a monitor sufficiently trusted to both
separate different domains of activity, and allow read-down
to less sensitive domains (as does MYSEA) is all the more
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difficult. While at least one was designed to provide high
assurance read-down capabilities [42], it was never fielded.
The VMM approach remains problematic for separation of
different domains of data because of the difficulty of creat-
ing a trusted VMM. This task is made even more difficult
because many current microprocessors are not strictly vir-
tualizable [62], which increases the complexity of software.
Non-distributed approaches to support access to multi-
level data via COTS applications have been proposed in
Seaview and some VMM architectures [22, 50, 60]. Purple
Pennelope has limited assurance, as it runs as a user-level
application wrapping Windows NT, and it does not support
a modifiable session level. The others rely on an underlying
reference validation mechanism that controls access to mul-
tilevel data. The MYSEA project extends certain concepts
from these projects into a distributed environment.
Replication architectures [27] provide a simple technique
to achieve near-term multilevel security by copying all in-
formation at low security levels to all dominating levels. On
a small scale, they may work rather well; on a large scale,
in terms of both the number of documents to be replicated
and the number of security levels to which documents are
replicated, they are untenable. The preponderance of DoD
information is either unclassified or designated sensitive but
unclassified. Similar proportions hold in the commercial sec-
tor. Replication of vast amounts of data to all higher levels
seems infeasible. MYSEA does not use replication as a fun-
damental mechanism, so avoids these problems.
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Network Pump
[40] allows messages from a low sensitivity level to be sent
to a high sensitivity level, and prohibits messages and other
information from going in the reverse direction. Addition-
ally, the NRL Pump has been proposed as part of an over-
all network architecture to provide more general two-way
connectivity between multiple subnets at different sensitiv-
ity levels, resulting in a multiple single-level (MSL) network
[41]. The capital and administrative cost of separately main-
tained LANs is a drawback that the MYSEA avoids.
Starlight [3] was designed to support logically separate
single-level workstations connected by a switch to data man-
agement subsystems at different (single) levels. Software as-
sociated with the switch ensures that the current level of
the workstation matches the level of the data subsystem in-
dicated by the switch setting. Starlight also allows low con-
fidentiality information to flow through the switch to high
sessions, providing a “read-down capability.” This approach
has the same basic drawbacks as theMSL network, described
above.
4.1 Other Multilevel Variations
The ruleset based access control (RSBAC) system [59] is
a Linux extension wherein all security relevant system calls
are routed through a central decision component. Access-
control decisions are based on the type of access and on
attributes attached to both the calling subject and the target
to be accessed. MYSEA’s DSS mechanism allows both a
more fine-grained and a more dynamic security policy.
The Security-Enhanced (SE) Linux project is an approach
to controlling multiple information domains in an open source
operating system [49, 71]. The Security-Enhanced Linux
project has not yet defined several mechanisms provided by
MYSEA:
• Remote-client login to the trusted OS
• Trusted path communications with the trusted OS
• Changing a user session security level
• A mechanism for assigning security-domain context to
a newly received network connection
• Trusted, rather than client, support for IPsec message
labeling
• Support for untrusted clients, i.e., clients not based on
Security-Enhanced Linux.
Content-based Information Security [66] relies on various
authentication and cryptographic technologies to mediate
user’s access to information, but like the other variants dis-
cussed in this section provides no underlying basis of trust to
ensure against subversion or malicious software that might
corrupt or leak information.
4.2 Trusted Path
Trusted path refers to mechanisms that provide assurance
that security-critical functions are provided by the real sys-
tem rather than masquerading software. Commercial sys-
tems, such as Windows [51], Trusted Solaris [72], and XTS-
400 [76] have implemented trusted path mechanisms. In the
case of Windows and Solaris, it is notable that the process-
ing of security requests is handled, at least partially, outside
of the system security perimeter (unless the entire system is
included within that perimeter, thus nullifying any possible
assurance arguments). In contrast to the MYSEA architec-
ture trusted path mechanism, the XTS-400 itself does not
support a remote trusted path.
4.3 Dynamic Security Services
Dynamic Security Services (sometimes referred to as“Qual-
ity of Security Service,” [35]) refers to offering variable levels
of security to both users and tasks in support of increasing
system quality. Thus, security is transformed from a per-
formance obstacle into an adaptive, constructive network
management parameter.
Historically, there have been several efforts in this direc-
tion. A quality of protection parameter is provided in the
GSSAPI specification [48]. This parameter is intended to
manage the level of protection provided to a message com-
munication stream by an underlying security mechanism (or
service), “allowing callers to trade off security processing
overhead dynamically against the protection requirements
for particular messages.” Another early reference to a vari-
able security service is that of Schneck and Schwan [67],
which discusses variable packet authentication rates with re-
spect to the management of system performance. References
to security in the QoS literature can be found in [19, 4, 77],
although little is mentioned there of security as a functional
QoS dimension.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The need for high-assurance architectures that implement
multi-domain information protection mechanisms is widespread
and growing. However, such architectures will not be adopted
unless they provide users with currently required function-
ality, the ability to easily incorporate new applications and
software updates, and a familiar interface.
MYSEA is a trusted distributed operating environment
for enforcing multi-domain security policies that supports
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unmodified COTS productivity applications in support of
usability. The architecture encompasses a combination of
many (untrusted) commercial components and relatively few
trusted multi-domain components. MYSEA introduces sev-
eral innovations for protecting multilevel data and for man-
aging security policies and security services in support of
critical applications, including:
1. A distributed high assurance architecture for control-
ling access to multiple data domains, which utilizes
commercial and open source applications
2. A high assurance distributed trusted path mechanism
3. Access to existing single-level networks
4. A QoSS framework providing dynamic (adaptive) se-
curity services
It is hoped that the development of high-assurance, highly
usable MLS architectures such as MYSEA will encourage
the adoption of MLS computing systems by the entities that
stand to benefit from their use.
In the future, we intend to support new applications in-
cluding voice mail, video telephones, and webmail. We are
also exploring multilevel aware collaboration services, and
the addition of QoSS to services other than network secu-
rity. Additional future work includes a Network File System
(NFS) port enhanced with ring-like privileges [68] in the user
domain, to help constrain the behavior of applications, and
a multilevel aware or multilevel DNS service [20].
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